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Imagine this sad story: You're a partner in asmall but prosperous law firm, and one of yourbright r young a s ciates blunders, and pretty
badly. She betrays a client, then avoids his calls
and e-mails, and finally misleads an arbitration
panel in an effort to cover her sloppiness. She gets
caught, and soon thereafter the Board of Bar
Overseers and bar counsel present disciplinary
charges against her. Very sad, indeed. Her career
was so promising.
But let's make it sadder still-what if, when
the BBO goes after her, they file similar charges
against you, too? "What?" you say. "I wasn't even
there. How can they charge me?" Indeed.
A case reported out of the District of Colum-
bia last year concerned a law firm partner in
exactly that situation, asking exactly that question.
But charge him they did, and he forfeited his
license to practice law for a month. His previously
unblemished reputation is now forever tarnished.
While the rules are a little different down in
D.C., the story is still a cautionary tale. Let us look
at it more closely and see if it has any relevance to
Massachusetts lawyers. Are partners responsible
for the bad deeds of their associates?
The Cohen Troubles in DC
Herbert Cohen was a partner in a 12-lawyer
firm in Washington, D.C. He introduced an
important client, Dr. Schleicher, to one of his more
promising young associates for help in registering
a trademark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office. Dr. Schleicher later introduced to the firm
David Dobbie, with whom he had entered into a
business arrangement whereby Dobbie would be
the exclusive distributor of the products to be sold
under the trademark. Schleicher and Dobbie then
had a falling out, and the young associate, who by
that time had developed a good relationship with
Dobbie, proceeded to file a withdrawal of the
pending trademark application, without telling Dr.
Schleicher, intending to file a new application in
the name of Dobbie alone. That withdrawal
falsely stated to the PTO that Schleicher's company
"expressly abandoned" the application. Cohen
was in the dark about these missteps, although the
case had originally been his and he had some
familiarity with it. When he learned of the
betrayal he intervened and succeeded in undoing
part of the harm visited on Dr. Schleicher. Not-
withstanding Cohen's intervention and
remediation, the good doctor still filed a bar
complaint against both Cohen and the associate.
Bar Counsel filed many charges against the
associate, including violations of several Rules of
Professional Conduct, including Rules 1.3(b)
(intentionally prejudicing a client); 1.4(a) (failure
to keep a client informed); 1.7(b) (conflict of
interest); 1.16(d) (failure to protect a client's
interest and surrender papers when withdrawing);
3.3(a) (making a false statement to a tribunal);
and 8.4(c) (engaging in dishonest conduct). But
Bar Counsel also filed each of those same charges
against Herbert Cohen, the partner who did not
participate-at all in the associate's malfeasance.
And it added two more to his list: violation of
Rules 5.1 (a) (failure to establish firm procedures
to supervise subordinates); and 5.1 (c)(2) (estab-
lishing a managing lawyer's responsibility for the
violations of a subordinate lawyer). After the bar
disciplinary proceedings, which found violations
of most of these rules, and an appeal to the D.C.
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Court of Appeals, Herbert Cohen lost his
bar card for 30 days.
The case is In re Herbert Cohen, 847
A.2d 1162, 2004 D.C. App. LEXIS 194
(2004). Let's see what lessons lawyers in
Massachusetts might learn from this sad
tale.
What the Story Means
Cohen's associate (and thus his law
firm) engaged in egregious conduct-
brazenly selling out a client in a pretty
unambiguous (from the reported
decision's rendering) conflict of interest
where the firm's other client benefited
directly. The associate also actively
misled a tribunal. The bar authorities
held Herbert Cohen vicariously liable for
the sins of his associate because he didn't
supervise the associate adequately,
because (it seems) they felt he should
have known about the associate's
misdeeds, and because his firm had no
procedures in place to ensure that the
associates and members complied with
the rules of professional conduct. Cohen
lost his right to practice in a very public
way for a month, costing him (we may
presume) many thousands of dollars in
lost business, to say nothing of his
reputation and good will.
Is this a case of "There, but for the
grace..."? Could it happen here?
The initial impulse might be to
distinguish the case (and thus conclude
that "this just couldn't happen to me")
based on the following two factors,
omitted from the story as just told: first,
the promising young associate was
Cohen's son. And second, D.C., where
Cohen practiced, has a version of Rule
5.1 (c)(2) which holds supervising lawyers
responsible for bad conduct of a subordi-
nate not just when they "know" of it, but
also when they "reasonably should
know" of it. (The ABA Model Rule and
the Massachusetts Rule lack the addi-
tional phrase "reasonably should know.")
So, we might conclude, in Massachusetts,
with associates who are not (literally) our
children, supervising lawyers won't get
into trouble if their associates happen to
betray a client as Cohen's son did.
But not so fast. It is of course true
that in Massachusetts a claim like that
brought against Cohen would invite
powerful and persuasive arguments that
absent actual knowledge the supervising
lawyer is off the hook. (Strongly support-
ing that argument is the great deal of
attention paid in the Cohen opinion to
the "reasonably should know" language
added by D.C. to the Model Rule lan-
guage.) But Cohen's discipline was also
based on a violation of Rule 5. 1(a),
which reads in D.C. exactly as it does in
Massachusetts. That rule reads as follows:
A partner in a law firm shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure
that the firm has in effect measures
giving reasonable assurances that
all lawyers in the firm conform to
the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Our sense is that bar disciplinarians
encountering such flagrant misconduct by
an associate will want to look for the
higher-ups to accept much responsibility.
It would be hard to pin that blame on the
higher-ups in Massachusetts under Rule
5.1(c)(2), but it would be far less hard to
do so using Rule 5. 1(a).
As it should be. While it is easy to
relegate Rule 5.1 (a) to the periphery of
our consciousness, lawyers who profit
from associates' work-sometimes
handsomely, as law firm managers laud
"leverage" as a key to profitability-ought
to share responsibility for the harm that
work sometimes causes. Only two states,
New York and New Jersey, impose
discipline on law firms, and intermittent
efforts by the ABA to amend its Model
Rules have never picked up much steam.
That means that in most states only
individual senior lawyers are left to
answer for the misdeeds of their law
firms' associates.
So what kinds of procedures would
satisfy Rule 5.1(a)? It seems to us at least
two protocols, likely in place in most
medium and large firms. First, a firm
ought to regularize close, direct supervi-
sion of associate work by more senior
lawyers. Second, firms ought to offer
(and require attendance at) periodic
education sessions about the Rules of
Professional Conduct and the law of
lawyering. It's hard to imagine that
Cohen's son missed the conflict between
Schleicher and Dobbie because of
inadequate training in conflicts doctrine,
but it is not hard to imagine scenarios
where serious mistakes and ethical lapses
occur simply because a lawyer doesn't
know what the rules say or mean. The
rules governing conflicts of interest (1.7,
1.8, and 1.9), the tension between the
lawyer's duties of confidentiality to clients
(1.6) and candor to the court (3.3), and
the need to keep zeal for a client's cause
within the bounds of a lawyer's obliga-
tion of honesty (4.1 and 8.4) and fair
play (4.2, 4.3, and 4.4) are rigorous but
often subtle. They require the develop-
ment of instincts, intuition, and insight
that come only with constant refresher
courses, mentoring, and monitoring by
senior lawyers, which Rule 5.1 demands.
So the Cohen case, while from a
different jurisdiction possessing a more
stringent rule imposing supervisor
liability for constructive, as well as actual,
knowledge and with a unique set of facts,
still serves as a welcome reminder to
supervising lawyers of their potential
exposure and, more important, of their
duties toward their clients and their
associates.
Finally, would law firm discipline
serve the interests of clients better than
individual sanctions as imposed in
Cohen? It is true that the Cohen decision's
reliance on Rule 5.1 leaves the managing
partner, chair, or even "ethics counsel" at
a law firm more at risk than other
partners, and that seems problematic.
Suggestions for law firm fines or, as
argued recently by a student in an
intriguing Harvard Law Review note
(Collective Sanctions and Large Law Firm
Discipline, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2336
(2005)), for collective ethics sanctions
against the lawyers working on matters in
which misconduct occurs, deserve some
serious thought. But we save that for
another day. 0
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